Revenue cap regulation is often combined with systematic benchmarking to reveal the managerial inefficiencies when regulating natural monopolies. One example is the European energy sector, where benchmarking methods are based on actual cost data, which are influenced by managerial inefficiency as well as operational heterogeneity. This paper demonstrates how a conditional nonparametric method, which allows the comparison of firms operating under heterogeneous technologies, can be used to estimate managerial inefficiency. A dataset of 123 distribution firms in Norway is used to show aggregate and firm-specific effects of conditioning. By comparing the unconditional model to our proposed conditional model and the model presently used by the Norwegian regulator, we see that the use of conditional benchmarking methods in revenue cap regulation may effectively distinguish between managerial inefficiency and operational heterogeneity. This distinction leads first to a decrease in aggregate efficient costs and second to a reallocation effect that affects the relative profitability of firms and relative customer prices, thus providing a fairer basis for setting revenue caps.
Introduction
In general, revenue-cap schemes tend to constrain monopolistic firm behavior by "capping" the revenues regulated firms are allowed to earn. Similar to price cap regulation, revenue caps provide incentives for cost reductions by efficiency improvement since firms are allowed to keep their additional profits from cost savings.
From the perspective of maximizing welfare, the regulator aims to implement a revenue-cap scheme in which the regulated firms sets prices equal to their average costs, i.e. the efficient costs C * i (the so-called second-best solution in regulation economics, Laffont and Tirole (1993) ; Armstrong and Sappington (2007) ; Shleifer (1985) ). The challenge, then, is to determine C * i due to information asymmetry.
1 To determine C
The precision of efficient cost approximation is incrementally related to the exogenous factors (Shleifer, 1985) describing the operational environment of regulated firms. Exogenous factors cause heterogeneity in terms of technol-
1 The regulator does not know the efficient cost structures of the regulated firms and they have no incentives to reveal the information. 2 Generally, benchmarking can be interpreted as creating a hypothetical competition among natural monopolies. Thereby a mechanism of yardstick competition in the spirit of Shleifer (1985) is introduced as the revenue of a particular electricity distribution firm based on the costs of all other distribution firms.
ogy, and hence, efficient costs. Consequently, the level of efficient costs differs between firms according to their environmental conditions.
In this paper, we demonstrate that regulators fail to implement efficient cost levels and revenue caps by not properly accounting for exogenous firm characteristics. We discuss unconditional nonparametric benchmarking applications used in regulation mainly based on data envelopment analysis (DEA), which set revenue caps too high and compensate firms for environmental disadvantages and managerial inefficiency. In particular, we analyze the importance of selecting the appropriate reference set for comparing firms to determine efficient costs, C * i . We suggest that conditioning a firm's production process on its operational environment provides more reliable peers. Because Norway has extensive experience with revenue cap regulation since 1997, we use a dataset of 123 Norwegian electricity distribution firms to test and compare three models: 1) an unconditional DEA benchmarking model; 2) a conditional DEA benchmarking model; and 3) the Norwegian regulator's model. We explicitly analyze two effects of conditioning: 1) the effects of a different peer selection; and 2) the effect of compensating for environmental variables under the conditional approach. We also demonstrate the effect of conditioning on the aggregate efficient costs, firms' profits, and consumers' prices for the distribution service. We see, for the Norwegian case, that the use of a conditional approach will lead to a reduction in aggregate efficient cost, but the main effect is a reallocation of revenue between firms, leading to changes in relative profitability and customer prices in the industry.
Even though we use Norway as a case study, our empirical application is relevant for the European regulators using nonparametric benchmarking methods to determine revenue caps. Our analysis is also relevant for general cases 3 in which nonparametric benchmarking is applied to compare decision-making units in different environments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the implementation of yardstick regulation via benchmarking and the challenges of separating managerial inefficiency and operational heterogeneity. Section 3 shows that the conditional framework is appropriate when heterogeneous firms are benchmarked against each other. Section 4 presents our empirical strategy and our data. Section 5 summarizes the empirical findings. Section 6 shows the effects of conditioning for regulation. Section 7 concludes.
2 Revenue cap regulation via benchmarking
Revenue cap regulation
A revenue cap regime can be implemented via the observed costs, C, of the firms (Joskow, 2007) and formalized as
where the capped revenue R i for firm i is determined by its actual observed cost C i and efficient cost C * i . The parameter α weights the actual and efficient costs with 0 < α < 1, according to the strength of the regulatory system.
Obviously, the observed firm-specific costs available to the regulator are influenced by firms' managerial inefficiency and the different operational environments. The major challenge for the regulator is to determine the firm-specific revenue caps, R i , such that they account for the environmental effects, meaning that firms will only be compensated for environmental disadvantages, not managerial inefficiency. 
Benchmarking and managerial inefficiency
In regulatory practice, the efficient cost, C * i , is often determined by means of an unconditional nonparametric benchmarking method, where data envelopment analysis (DEA), developed by Charnes et al. (1978) , is the most popular variant.
3 DEA estimates the unknown technology or production set Ψ from a given sample of observed vectors of inputs x i ∈ R p + and outputs y i ∈ R q + used by the firms i = 1, ..., n, and where p and q represent the number of input and output factors, respectively. The boundary of Ψ is the frontier and represents the estimated unknown technology (see Appendix A.1 for the standard DEA). Comparing each individual firm to this frontier determines the firm's specific managerial efficiency. Solving a linear program assuming constant returns to scale (CRS) according to Charnes et al. (1978) provides efficiency scoresθ ∈ R n such that 0 ≤θ i ≤ 1 for i = 1, ..., n. 4 The efficiency estimate for firm i, i.e.,θ i , is a measure relative to the frontier, which is determined by fully efficient observations j ∈ {1, ..., n} withθ j = 1, i.e., the peers.
In the unconditional case, DEA does not consider external factors. Hence, all observations belong to the reference set of the particular observation of 3 Frontier models are widely applied in performance measurement. The theoretical foundations derive from Koopmans (1957) , Debreu (1959) and Farrell (1957) . In regulatory practice, nonparametric approaches have outperformed parametric methods due to their easy implementation and interpretation, which is often why regulators favor their use. See Bogetoft and Otto (2011) for a comparison and critical evaluation of the approaches in regulatory practice. 4 Regulators often assume CRS as proposed by Charnes et al. (1978) , because it implies that any observed production plan can be arbitrarily scaled up and down, and it implies that all convex combinations of two observed production plans are assumed to be feasible.
The validity of these assumptions, which are beyond the scope of this paper, are not further discussed.
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interest and potentially serve as its peers irrespective of their operational environments. However, this involves the risk of evaluating an observation to an infeasible frontier when external factors are disadvantageous or beneficial, respectively, to its production process.
Managerial inefficiency versus operational heterogeneity
It is worthwhile to emphasize that the external factors can have different channels through which they influence firms' performance. Bȃdin et al. (2012) point out that environmental factors may influence the technology itself represented by the boundary of the production set Ψ, thus causing a frontier shift, the distribution of inefficiency, or both. The regulator has to compensate for the resulting cost disadvantages only from exogenous frontier shifts due to different environments, and not for managerial inefficiency.
We will assume that the environmental impact can be measured by a set of vectors z i ∈ R r for i = 1, ..., n, where r is the number of environmental factors. In practice, regulators use second-stage regressions (Bjørndal et al., 2010; Agrell et al., 2014) to control for the heterogeneity of operational environments on the frontier. The z-variables are regressed on the DEA estimates to determine the impact of the operational environments on efficiency. The efficiency scores are then adjusted to compensate for the impact of z-variables. One concern, however, is that second-stage regressions are only useful when z-variables fulfill the separability condition (Bȃdin et al., 2012; Simar and Wilson, 2007) . 5 But when separability is given, there is no frontier shift due to environmental differences and a compensation by means of second-stage regressions will fail to set efficient revenue caps.
In addition, if z-variables cause a frontier shift, and thus are not separable which is usually the case, DEA efficiency scores from the first step lack economic sounding, since they are based on a frontier that production units are unable to reach (Bȃdin et al., 2012) . Using second-stage regressions ignores the potential impact of z-variables on the frontier and their potential impact on the distribution of inefficiency. Therefore, compensation based on the two-stage approach is likely to capture multiple effects and lead to under-or overcompensation of the individual regulated firms, which becomes apparent in a too high or too low C * i , and therefore a too high or too low R i .
Conditional benchmarking
Conditional nonparametric benchmarking approaches, which do not require the separability condition, can account for the multiple effects of the operational environment on a firm's performance 6 depending on how the reference sets, i.e. the group of firms use to compare against the firm of interest, are selected. By means of kernel estimation the reference sets are restricted with respect to z-variables, prior to measuring actual performance such that firms are only compared to others with similar environments. 7 Compensa-6 To incorporate external factors into the performance evaluation, conditional efficiency estimation was proposed initially by Cazals et al. (2002) in the order-m framework and further developed by Daraio and Simar (2005) , Daraio and Simar (2007b) , and Daraio and Simar (2007a) . The approach aims to compare only units that operate under similar operation environments, i.e. the selection of the reference group for a particular observation is conditional on their z-variables. 7 Thus, conditioning the performance evaluation on z-variables assumes that the frontier is feasible for the firm to reach, and that the efficiency scores are meaningful (Bȃdin et al., tion for the resulting cost disadvantages is only based on the frontier shift, thus leading to an adequate implementation of the revenue cap scheme.
Constructing a conditional efficiency estimator
The conditional DEA estimator is based on an attainable production set, Ψ z , conditioned on a set of z-variables and implies the estimation of a conditional distribution function where the production process is conditional to a particular level of z (Daraio and Simar, 2007b; Bȃdin et al., 2010) . 8 The latter requires applying a smoothing technique. Therefore, we perform Kernel estimation with an Epanechnikov kernel K(·) as in, e.g., Daraio and Simar (2005) and Daraio and Simar (2007b) . 9 The Kernel is defined as
where z i and z k are vectors of z-variables for a unit i and it's reference unit k, respectively, and h is the vector of selected bandwidths. For each of the environmental variables we compute a bandwidth based on least squares cross validation (Hall et al., 2004; Racine, 2007, 2008) . Note that the bandwidth selection procedure relies on estimating the conditional probability distribution function of y, given a particular level of z. 10 Hall et al. (2004) emphasize that their proposed method assigns large smoothing parameters to components of z that are irrelevant for estimating the density of y. Therefore, the sizes of the selected bandwidths themselves already contain information about the impact of particular z-variables on the production 2012). 8 The statistical properties of this estimator are derived in Kneip et al. (2008) and its consistency is established in Jeong et al. (2010) . 9 The authors suggest using kernels with compact support in the framework of conditional boundary estimation. 10 See Hall et al. (2004) for a detailed presentation of the method. 8 output y. We then use the obtained bandwidths to estimate the Kernel function in Equation 2 to compute kernel probabilities. Firms closely located to firm i in terms of z thereby receive higher probabilities to be selected into the reference set of the observation of interest, whereas small (or even zero) kernel probabilities are assigned to firms with very different operational environments than firm i.
As shown in Daraio and Simar (2007b) , the conditional DEA efficiency estimate for firm i under the assumption of CRS is given bŷ
and
where the vector h ∈ R r represents bandwidths of appropriate size. For each observation, the bandwidths determine the range of z in which other observations are considered being similar. Hence, we consider only the observations within this range as potential peers for the unit of interest and select them into the respective reference group. That is, we restrict the reference set of firm i to firms with positive kernel probabilities.
Bias-correction
DEA efficiency scores are based on finite samples of observations and construct a best-practice frontier, i.e. by construction they are upward-biased Simar and Wilson (1998) . We correct for the bias inθ andθ c by applying the m-bootstrap first proposed by Kneip et al. (2008) , and extended by Simar and Wilson (2011) . 11 Unlike the naive bootstrap, this approach allows consistent bias-correction by drawing bootstrap subsamples of size m = n κ from
11 As a variant of the original procedure, we also use the kernel probabilities in order to construct the bootstrap samples for the conditional case, which is consistent with the idea of conditioning the production process and is supposed to give even more precise insights the given sample of size n with κ ∈ (0, 1). Each of the b = 1, ...B bootstrap samples (replications) provides a random subsample of size m which we use to compute the bootstrapped vector of efficiency scores denoted asθ m,b ∈ R n .
The bias for the unconditional DEA and the conditional DEA is defined aŝ
where the factor (m/n) 2/(p+q+1) controls for the effect of different sample sizes in both the true world and bootstrap world . Then, we obtain bias-corrected efficiency scores,θ andθ c by subtracting the bias fromθ andθ c repsectively.θ
Cazals et al. (2002) show that subsampling also overcomes the outlier sensitivity of convex nonparametric frontier models such as DEA models. Although the statistical literature does not precisely define outliers, they can be understood as atypical observations that possibly influence the efficiency estimates of other data points if they distort the frontier Simar (2003) . By drawing m out of n observations from the sample, we reduce the influence of potential outliers since they will not always be drawn. Therefore, the computed biases in Equations 4 and 5 are robust toward outliers and helps us tackle the problem. We do not delete outliers from the sample because they give us important information about the heterogeneity of operational environments and the effects on the production frontier.
12 about the effect of z-variables on the production process.
12 Regulators also need to include all firms in the analysis.
4 Empirical strategy and data
Empirical strategy
Our objective is to demonstrate that conditioning a firm's production process on its operational environment gives us a better yardstick for determining efficient cost. Therefore, we compare the outcomes of the unconditional model used in regulation with our proposed conditional model to show the effects of conditioning on efficiency estimates, revenue caps, firms' profits, and prices consumers have to pay. As mentioned, we estimate three different models:
1. The bias-corrected unconditional DEA model (θ).
2. The bias-corrected conditional DEA model (θ c ).
3. The unconditional DEA model with second-stage regression based on the bias-corrected unconditional DEA scores used by the Norwegian
We run 2,000 replications to obtain the bias-corrected efficiency estimates by the m-bootstrap where drawing the reference sets depends on the respective kernel probabilities. We select m = 60 using the leave-one-out-order-m algorithm proposed by Daraio and Simar (2007a) and Simar (2003) based on Cazals et al. (2002) . Note thatθ N V E are based onθ, and we correct these estimates by the effects of the environmental factors using the secondstage procedure described in Amundsveen et al. (2014) . 13 The first effect of conditioning, i.e., different a different peer selections, becomes obvious when comparingθ toθ c . The second effect of conditioning i.e. compensating differently for z-variables becomes obvious when comparingθ c toθ N V E .
Data
Our dataset comprise 123 Norwegian electricity distribution firms regulated by the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE). Since the deregulation of the Norwegian power market in 1990, the regulatory regime for distribution and regional transmission firms 14 has gone through several phases. In the first years after deregulation, firms were subject to a cost plus (rate of return) regulation with rather week efficiency incentives. In 1997, revenue cap regulation with benchmarking was introduced with five-year regulation periods.
Firm-specific efficiency requirements in each of the first two regulation periods, were based on DEA analysis of historical cost and output data. After 2007, the efficiency incentives were further strengthened with the introduction of a yearly revenue cap implementation and annual updates of the revenue caps based on DEA analyses. Table 1 lists the input and output variables in our dataset corresponding to those used in the regulatory benchmarking model. The input variable measures total expenditures(TotEx), which comprise five cost elements: the value of lost load (VOLL), thermal power losses, capital depreciation, operation and maintenance expenses, and return on capital. 16 We follow the practice of NVE and construct our benchmarks based on average data over a five-year period, having adjusted the data to the price level of a base year.
Inputs and outputs
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Output variables measure the number of customers, length of the high voltage network, and the number of network stations (transformers). 
Environmental variables
We use three variables to measure heterogeneous operational conditions (see Table 1 ). The first, z Dis , is the average distance between the road network and a firm's network, representing the increased difficulty of maintaining a network that is not easily accessible. The second, z U nd , is the share of underground cables that may imply cost disadvantages because of expensive installation as well as cost advantages in terms of fewer outages and lower VOLL. The third is the share of fast-growing forest, z F or that may represent a cost disadvantage due to the added cost of forest clearing.
18 Table 2 output y. Therefore, they indicate a respective z-variable's importance for selecting the reference set in our conditional efficiency estimation.
Results
Selected bandwidths
For the distance to road variable z Dis , Table 3 shows a very large bandwidth compared to the median value of 142.9 shown in Table 2 . Thus, this variable is smoothed out in the kernel density estimation, which implies that the overall impact of z Dis on output y is limited, and therefore, the reference sets are not restricted by z Dis . The magnitudes of bandwidths for the other two variables, 0.29615 for z U nd and 0.12891 for z F or , are considerably smaller.
For interpretation, we again compare the bandwidths to the median values in Table 2 , i.e., 0.306 for z U nd and 0.1191 for forest z F or , respectively. We suggest that the exogenously induced cost disadvantages, which would be measured as inefficiency, if not controlled for, are most likely due to z U nd and z F or . 
Reference sets and selected peers
To illustrate how estimated bandwidths affect the selection of the firms comprising the reference set, when individual firms are benchmarked, we start by looking at a firm which we will denote i 0 . Figure The shaded area in the right panel is not limited in the dimension of distance, which is due to its large bandwidths. Note that this shaded area also includes gray-colored firms because they are similar in terms of z Dis but not in terms of z U nd , and therefore, do not belong to the reference set of firm i 0 .
Given that the kernel centers around firm i 0 , the density estimation produces that when unconditional DEA is used, each firm in our sample is evaluated against a frontier spanned by peers with dissimilar operational environments (for a detailed list of the sizes of reference sets and identical and different peers in unconditional and conditional models see Appendix 7). 
Efficiency estimates
We focus on our three efficiency measures (θ,θ c ,θ N V E ) to demonstrate the effect of differences with respect to reference sets and peer selection. Table   4 lists the descriptive statistics of the estimated efficiency scores.
As expected, the statistics ofθ c exceed their unconditional counterparts for θ. For example, the median efficiency score is 0.6977 when exogenous factors are accounted for and greater than 0.6557 where the frontier is estimated without considering heterogeneous operation environments. The difference between the point estimates indicates that exogenous factors indeed produce cost disadvantages for the median firm, shifting its feasible frontier such that its efficiency increases by roughly 4 percent. Hence, ifθ scores are used for any further analysis, the median firm will be evaluated based on a technically infeasible frontier.
Comparingθ c withθ N V E estimates reveals that efficiency is higher when the correction for external factors is made via second-stage regression. We interpret this finding as empirical evidence of biased performance measures and note that this bias results from both the underlying and economically meaninglessθ estimates and the second-stage regression, which assumes that z-variables do not affect the frontier. Based on these results, it is likely that NVE compensates both the frontier shifts due to exogenous variables and the managerial inefficiency because the effects of both on the estimated technology are not appropriately separated. The rank correlations shown in Table 5 further illustrate the relationship between the estimators. We see that the second-stage adjustment under NVEs method does not affect the firm ranking very much, since the correlation betweenθ andθ N V E is as high as 0.96, while the ranking under conditional DEA is less correlated with the rankings based on the other two estimators. This could imply that the relative effects of adjustment for exogenous cost drivers are greater with the conditional DEA method than with NVEs current procedure. 
Impact of the exogenous factors on the frontier
In addition to the bandwidths obtained as mentioned above, we want to analyze the impact of the environmental variables on the production process by using the ratio of conditional to unconditional efficiency scores. Bȃdin et al. (2012) emphasize that unconditional measures of efficiency are economically meaningless if z-variables impact the frontier since units are compared to infeasible production plans. Knowing that conditional measures control for this, the ratio, therefore, informs us about the local effect of z-variables on the attainable frontier. 21 The ratio ρ is defined as
where we refer to the bias-corrected measures. The ratio ρ takes the value of 1 if both measures are equal, i.e. there is no frontier shift, whereas other values imply that the feasible frontier shifts due to z-variables. A ratio larger than 1 implies that the conditional exceeds the unconditional efficiency score indicating cost disadvantages due to the external factors, whereas ratios with values smaller than 1 indicate cost advantages. To analyze the local effect of the exogenous factors on the feasible frontier, we plot the ratio ofθ c tõ θ. Both panels in Figure 3 sort firm-specific efficiency ratios in an increasing order of the values of z U nd and z F or .
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Notably, the ratios of the two performance measures differ from 1 for almost all firms; the range is roughly 0.9 to 1.4. Hence, z-variables significantly affect production. Also, in 95 of the 123 firms, the ratio, based on bias-corrected efficiency estimates, is larger than 1. Therefore, the frontier-shifting factors mainly lead to cost disadvantages. 
Effects for regulation
The three models also demonstrate that the choice of benchmarking model, including how to compensate for the effect of exogenous factors, has impor-
22 From the bandwidth analysis we know that the frontier shift is mainly driven by these two factors.
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tant regulatory effects for firms' customers and owners. We start by looking at the impact on the aggregate efficient costs and then look in detail at firmspecific profitability (return on capital) and the average prices custumers pay per kWh. We base our calculations on the current revenue cap model used by the Norwegian regulator (NVE). Similar to Equation 1, as well as the DEA-based mechanism proposed by Bogetoft (1997) , the revenue cap for firm i is set by
where α = 0.6. The efficient costs C * i are either calculated byθ
The yardstick formula 9 is applied every year to set the annual revenue caps, but in order to simplify the presentation we will drop the time subscripts in our notation 23 .
NVE calibrates the revenue caps, by adding the amount ∆ i to the efficient cost of each firm 24 , in order to ensure that revenue equals cost for the industry as a whole, i.e., R = C. The rationale for the calibration, as described in Amundsveen and Kvile (2015) and Bjørndal et al. (2010) , is to allow the representative firm, with an efficiency equal to the industry (cost-weighted) average, to have a return on its capital equal to the regulated rate of return.
23 We focus on the most important features of the Norwegian regulation. In practice,
there is a two-year time lag in the reporting; the revenue caps in year t must be based on the data available after year t − 2. We assume that the average of the data for 2008-2012 is representative of a typical year, and we do not consider the timing of the revenue stream.
Many firms also own and operate part of the regional transmission network, but we do not consider this part of their revenue caps. 24 In the present regulation model, the calibration takes the form
where BV i is the total book value of capital for firm i. The use of book values in the calibration formula is done to correct for a suspected age bias in the capital costs.
Given the calibration scheme, firms that have above-average efficiency scores will earn more than the regulated rate of return, while firms with belowaverage efficiency scores will earn less.
Effect on aggregate efficient costs
Because of the revenue calibration performed by NVE, the compensation scheme for exogenous factors will have no effect on aggregate revenue. In order to study aggregate effects, we will therefore focus on efficient costs. The first row in Table 6 shows the aggregate efficient cost from the unconditional DEA model, i.e., C * (θ), and the second row shows what the compensation for the exogenous factors will be when it is based on one of the estimatorsθ As shown on the last row of Table 6 , the aggregate revenue will be unaffected by the choice of compensation scheme.
6.2 Effect on firm-specific profits and customer prices 
In order to make the example interesting in a more general setting, we also show firm-specific effects without the calibration effect, i.e., with ∆ i = 0, as dots in the figure. We divide the firm-specific revenues by their total book values, BV i , to see the effects on return on capital. In general, the effects on return on capital vary from -3.8 (-3.2) percent to +5.4 (+6.0) percent, where a positive value reflects a higher return on capital under the NVE model compared to conditional DEA, and where numbers in parenthesis are effects without calibration. The main effect that we see from the figure is a reallocation of revenue due to the change in compensation method, and this is related to the difference in relative efficiency scores under the respective methods, cf., the difference in rank correlations shown in Section 5.3. The difference between the calibrated and the uncalibrated effects is related to the overcompensation of 359 MNOK in the efficient cost level by the NVE two-stage method, as discussed in the previous section. According to formula 9, 60 percent of this overcompensation will be awarded to the firms, and this 24 represents an increase of 0.6 percent in the return on capital for each firm. 
Conclusion
In its basic notion, nonparametric benchmarking methods, such as data envelopment analysis that is implemented by several European energy regu- lead not only to a decrease in aggregate efficient costs, but more importantly to a reallocation effect that affects the relative profitability of firms and relative customer prices, and may provide a fairer basis for setting revenue caps.
This insight is relevant when using benchmarks for revenue cap regulation, and, more generally, when nonparametric benchmarking is used to compare decision making units in different operational environments.
